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THE COMMON KNOWLEDGE OF
TAX ABUSE
Mark P. Gergen*
HE usual objection to the standards of tax motive and economic
substance is that they lead to unprincipled decisions. Joseph Isen-
bergh lambasted decisions applying the standards as "an essen-
tially aesthetic response to attempts by taxpayers thought unworthy of
success ... [and] unappealing."' Judge McKee, dissenting in the court of
appeals in ACM Partnership v. Commissioner,2 accused the majority of
using a "smell test" and chastised: "Our inquiry [ought to be] cerebral,
not visceral. To the extent that the Commissioner is offended by these
transactions, he should address Congress and/or the rulemaking process
and not the courts."' 3 Alan Gunn has said that "efforts to explain the
results of tax cases ... by reference to 'tax avoidance' are never satisfac-
tory."'4 But behind these charges that the standards are unprincipled lie
conflicting arguments. Isenbergh and McKee want officials to enforce tax
rules as they are written; Gunn wants officials to make tax law more co-
herent and principled. An answer to the case in principle against the
standards emerges from the conflict between these positions. The stan-
dards mediate between our desire that tax law be coherent and principled
and our desire that it be rule-bound. Rather than being an abnegation of
the rule of law, the standards are a product of a commitment to law by
imperfect rules.
This point is understood, at some level, by many tax lawyers.5 Yet it is
worth making. Still the argument is heard that the standards are lawless. 6
It is worth reminding ourselves of the emptiness of this attack. On a
more positive note, we learn something important about how the stan-
* I thank Calvin Johnson, Clarissa Potter, David Weisbach, and participants in the
Georgetown Tax Policy Workshop for the comments on an earlier draft.
1. Joseph Isenbergh, Musings on Form and Substance in Taxation, 49 U. CHI. L. REv.
859, 874, 876 (1982).
2. 157 F.3d 231 (3d Cir. 1998), aff'g in part, rev'g in part, 73 T.C.M. (CCH) 2189
(1997), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1017 (1999).
3. Id. at 265.
4. Alan Gunn, Tax Avoidance, 76 MICH. L. REV. 733 (1978).
5. See David P. Hariton, Sorting Out the Tangle of Economic Substance, 52 TAX LAW.
235, 236-241 (1999); Dana L. Trier, Beyond the Smell Test: The Role of Substantive Anti-
Avoidance Rules in Addressing the Corporate Tax Shelter Problem, TAXES, Mar. 2000, at
62, 67.
6. See Kenneth J. Kies, Letter to the Editor, 88 TAX NoTEs 133 (2000); Kenneth W.
Gideon, Assessing the Income Tax: Transparency, Simplicity, Fairness, 81 TAX NoTEs 999
(1998).
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dards ought to be applied. That an action was tax motivated or insub-
stantial is neither a necessary nor sufficient reason to deny it positive tax
consequences. There is always and finally a question of tax law, albeit a
question that sometimes will turn on implicit norms of tax law or on the
common knowledge of tax professionals. 7 We better appreciate recent
anti-abuse regulations and rulings, in particular the partnership anti-
abuse regulations. 8 These regulations posit norms of tax law that cannot
be violated intentionally but that can be violated inadvertently in the
sense that their violation can be a by-product of actions that themselves
are not tax-motivated and have economic substance. These anti-abuse
rules deter taxpayers from purposefully exploiting simplifying tax rules
that we know miscalculate income but which we generally tolerate for
reasons of administrative efficiency. 9
This explanation of anti-abuse law is conducive to David Weisbach's
economic argument for why we might want to have simple rules of tax
law that are backstopped by anti-abuse standards. 10 Weisbach's work,
like almost all academic work on tax law today, takes an external to law
perspective-his claims are about tax law, they are not claims of tax law.
That an external to law, economic perspective can justify the anti-abuse
standards is not surprising, for this perspective places no intrinsic value
on the law being transparent and non-arbitrary. There is a deep irony
here. The external to law perspective dismisses tax law as an object wor-
thy of study and reflection in its own right, but the success of anti-abuse
standards depends upon players in the system believing in the integrity of
tax law.
The standards of tax motive and economic substance are used to deter-
mine when a taxpayer may not have a positive result under a tax rule
even though he has complied literally with the terms of the rule. The
standard of tax motive, in its purest form, is something like the precept
"No X if A is done solely for tax reasons,"'" where X is a positive tax
result that follows from act A under some rule of tax law. The converse
form is "No X unless A is done for a substantial business purpose."' 2 The
7. See infra notes 11-32, 75-77 and accompanying text. There is one unfortunate con-
sequence of recognizing the implicit issue of law. Decisions of the tax court would then be
subject to de novo review by courts of appeals. See ACM, 157 F.3d at 245.
8. See Treas. Reg. § 1.701-2 (2000).
9. See infra notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
10. See David A. Weisbach, Formalism in the Tax Law, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 860, 867-72(1999) [hereinafter Formalism in Tax Law]; see also Daniel N. Shaviro, Economic Sub-
stance, Corporate Tax Shelters, and the Compaq Case, 88 TAX NOTES 221 (2000); David A.
Weisbach, An Efficiency Analysis of Line Drawing in the Tax Law, 29 S. LEGAL STUDIES
71 (2000) [hereinafter Line Drawing in the Tax Law]; DAVID A. WEISBACH, AN ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF ANTI-TAx AVOIDANCE DOCTRINES (Univ. of Chicago Law Sch., John M.
Olin Law & Econ. Working Paper No. 99, 2000) available at <http://www.law.uchicago.edu/
Publications/Working/> [hereinafter ECONOMIC ANALYSIS].
11. See Preliminary Senate Finance Committee Discussion Draft Regarding Corporate
Tax Shelters (May 24, 2000) (proposing as a test for a corporate tax shelter "that a signifi-
cant purpose of such arrangement is the avoidance or evasion or Federal income tax"); see
also Gunn, supra note 4, at 737-38 (providing a collection of cases).
12. See Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809 (2d Cir. 1934), affd, 293 U.S. 465 (1935).
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standard of economic substance is something like the precept "No X if A
is not expected to meaningfully alter the taxpayer's position, tax consider-
ations to the side."' 13 Another form of the precept, different in a key re-
spect,14 is "No X if A is expected to worsen the taxpayer's position tax
considerations to the side."' 15 These standards are well established in the
law. They have been invoked by judges in a line of cases that run from
Gregory,16 through Knetsch,17 to ACM.18 They appear in the Code,19 in
the Regulations, 20 and they have been invoked by the Treasury in anti-
abuse rulings.21 Sometimes the standards are qualified by objective ele-
ments that serve as proxies for tax motives and economic substance. 22
13. I strongly recommend David P. Hariton, Sorting Out the Tangle of Economic Sub-
stance, 52 TAX LAw. 235 (1999), for a more thorough analysis of this standard. The rule in
text is a translation of the standard stated in Knetsch v. United States, 364 U.S. 361, 366
(1960), that the "transaction ... did 'not appreciably affect his beneficial interest except to
reduce his tax..."' (quoting dissenting opinion in Gilbert v. Commissioner, 248 F.2d 399,
411 (2d Cir. 1957)). The general partnership anti-abuse regulation set forth in Treas. Reg.
§ 1.701-2(a)(1) requires that a transaction "be entered into for a substantial business pur-
pose." Id. And Treas. Reg. § 1.701-2(b) permits the Commissioner to recast "a transaction
a principal purpose of which is to reduce substantially the present value of the partners'
aggregate federal tax liability .... " Id. The later rule is instantiated by "a comparison of
the purported business purpose for a transaction and the claimed tax benefits resulting
from the transaction." Treas. Reg. § 1.701(2)(c).
14. One way to express the difference is that the first rule stated in text gets at the
quality of emptiness while the second rule gets at the quality of irrationality. A sham
divorce is empty if one assumes nothing untoward might happen before the couple remar-
ries. If there is a risk of an untoward event, such as one partner dying, a sham divorce is
irrational, tax considerations to the side. An action is both empty and irrational when it is
done at a positive transaction cost but is otherwise devoid of significance.
15. Alvin C. Warren, Jr., The Requirement of Economic Profit in Tax Motivated Trans-
actions, TAXES, Dec. 1981, at 986-88 (discussing Knetsch and Goldstein v. Commissioner,
364 F.2d 734 (2d Cir. 1966)). This standard was rejected by a majority of the Tax Court in
Stanton v. Commission, CCH Tax Ct. Rptr. 2313 (1960). In determining whether an action
is irrational the action is compared not just to the alternative of inaction. An action is
compared to other actions that would accomplish the same non-tax objectives. So it was
no defense of the complex transaction in ACM that it had the real business end of retiring
the taxpayer's debt because there were cheaper ways to achieve this end.
16. 69 F.2d at 809.
17. 364 U.S. at 366.
18. 157 F.3d at 231.
19. I.R.C. §§ 269, 7701(f) (2000). Proposed legislation on corporate tax shelters target
any arrangement if "a significant purpose is the avoidance or evasion of Federal income
tax." Preliminary Senate Finance Committee Discussion Draft Regarding Corporate Tax
Shelter Legislation (May 24, 2000), proposed I.R.C. § 6662A(c)(1)(A). Objective criteria
define arrangements that are deemed to run afoul of this standard. These include profits
insignificant relative to tax benefits, I.R.C. § 6662(A)(c)(2)(B); the allocation of taxable
income or gain to a "tax-indifferent party" in excess of economic income that redounds to
the tax benefit of the corporation, I.R.C. § 6662(A)(c)(2)(C); or significant tax benefits
coupled with a tax indemnity, a permanent discrepancy between tax and book income, or
little economic risk, I.R.C. § 6662(A)(c)(2)(D).
20. See Treas. Reg. § 1.701-2.
21. Typically these announcements invoke numerous tax avoidance doctrines and stat-
utes making the best rationale difficult to discern. See Rev. Rul. 99-14, 1999-13 I.R.B. 3;
I.R.S. Notice 99-59, 1999-52 I.R.B. 761; I.R.S. Notice 99-36, 1999-26 I.R.C. 3.
22. An objective element can magnify one of the worrisome properties of anti-abuse
rules. At the margin, such rules heighten the deadweight loss from opportunistic tax plan-
ning because taxpayers set upon achieving a proscribed tax benefit will alter their behavior
to bring themselves within the rule. This phenomenon is identified in Shaviro, supra note
2001]
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Thus, under a discredited version of the step transaction doctrine, passing
through point B on the way from point A to point C will be disregarded
only if there was a pre-commitment to continue through point B to point
C.23 The element of pre-commitment establishes that point B was tax
motivated and insubstantial. A rule presuming economic substance in a
position if it is held for a sufficient length of time functions in the same
way. 2
4
The sham divorce cases are a homey example of the standards at
work.25 The marital status of taxpayers is determined on the last day of
the year.26 Married couples, who would pay less in taxes if they file single
returns, have tried to file as singles by divorcing at the end of the year
and remarrying at the beginning of the next. The courts deny the taxpay-
ers single status. There is some debate about whether this result depends
upon the divorce being legally ineffective for non-tax purposes. Gold-
stein v. Commissioner27 shows that the divorce be a sham in the literal
sense is not essential to the result. Mrs. Goldstein made real contracts
with different parties, borrowing at 4% while investing at 1% or 1.5%, to
shelter her winnings from the Irish Sweepstakes. The realness of the con-
tracts did not establish them as bona fide for tax purposes.28
I put to the side arguments aimed solely at the subjectivity of the stan-
dard of tax motive and the converse standard of absence of business pur-
pose.29 A standard of motive or purpose has been criticized on the
ground that it is not administrable. An actor's true motive, it is said, is
unknowable, and apparent motive is too easily feigned. 30 The standard
also has been criticized on grounds of fairness. It is unfair, the argument
10, at 221, and Line Drawing in the Tax Law, supra note 10, at 76-79, 82-83, 86. For exam-
ple, a taxpayer who is set upon the stratagem of using a partnership to eventually dispose
of property without recognizing gain will incur the extra cost and inconvenience of main-
taining an interest in the property through a partnership with the buyer for a period of two
years to avoid one of the critical shoals of the disguised sale rules. The same phenomenon
occurs even without formal and explicit safe-harbors and shoals in anti-abuse law because
officials and tax planners will use unwritten rules of thumb to decide what is abusive and
what is not.
23. On the three different versions of the step-transaction doctrine, see McDonald's
Restaurants, Inc. v. Commissioner, 688 F.2d 520, 524-25 (7th Cir. 1982). For statements
that the binding commitment test is no longer applied, see Associated Wholesale Grocers v.
United States, 927 F.2d 1517, 1522 (10th Cir. 1991); Joshua D. Rosenberg, Tax Avoidance
and Income Measurement, 87 MICH. L. REv. 365, 404 (1988).
24. For an example, see the disguised sale regulations, Treas. Reg. § 1.707-3(c) (pro-
viding that transfers made more than two years apart are presumed not to be a sale and
need not be disclosed to IRS).
25. See Boyter v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 989 (1980), remanded, 668 F.2d 1382 (4th Cir.
1981); Rev. Rul. 76-255, 1976-1 C.B. 281.
26. See Treas. Regs. §§ 1-143-1(a) and 1.6013-4(a).
27. 364 F.2d 734 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1005 (1967).
28. See id.
29. Walter J. Blum, Motive, Intent, and Purpose in Federal Income Taxation, 34 U. CHI.
L. REV. 485 (1967).
30. To this one might answer all the more reason to put great weight on evidence of
tax motive when it exists, as the court did in Saba Partnership v. Commissioner, 78 T.C.M.




goes, to treat two people in the same position differently because they
had different motives in reaching that position.31 Whatever one's view of
the merits of a subjective standard standing alone, when paired with the
objective standard of economic substance, it serves the important func-
tion of signaling to officials that they are not to second guess business or
personal judgments that do not seem tax-driven. The objective standard
of economic substance is not a requirement that an action be reasonable
to have tax consequences. Thus, in a case of an alleged sham divorce, if
the couple can persuade the court that they foolishly got divorced after a
holiday spat and changed their mind in the sober light of the new year,
the divorce should be recognized in the eyes of tax law.
One other objection to the standards can be put to the side. Judge
McKee's argument in ACM that the Commissioner should look to Con-
gress and not to the courts suggests that he thinks the principle of legisla-
tive supremacy is at stake. 32 This particular argument is frivolous at this
level of generality. 33 The courts and the Treasury have long played a sig-
nificant role in making tax law, with Congress' acquiescence. Transac-
tions that run afoul of the standards of tax motive and economic
substance usually exploit technical details of tax law on which Congress
says little and probably cares less. Thus, the transaction in ACM took
advantage of the combination of two highly technical tax rules to produce
an artificial capital loss. One rule was statutory in the partnership area
and the other was regulatory in the area of contingent debt.34 In any
event, Judge McKee conceded the Commissioner's lawmaking power
when he indicated that the Commissioner could use the rulemaking pro-
cess to address the transaction in ACM. The concern for legislative
supremacy cannot explain a preference for executive action by rule-mak-
ing rather than by litigation. If anything, the litigation route presents less
threat of intrusion because it requires the complicity of the third branch.
31. This argument turns on the assumption that actors who do the same thing for dif-
ferent reasons are similarly situated. This does not hold up as a general proposition. The
law often takes account of motive in evaluating actions. This is commonplace in criminal
law and tort law. The argument is that tax law is different because tax is a function of an
actor's income, i.e., his economic position. See Blum, supra note 29. But we know that tax
law imperfectly measures income, often for administrative reasons. I have yet to hear a
cogent argument why it is unfair to treat an actor who consciously tries to exploit the law's
imperfections to understate his income differently than an actor who inadvertently benefits
from these imperfections.
32. See ACM, 157 F.3d at 265.
33. The argument is not frivolous when Congress has responded to the specific prob-
lem. Corporate-owned life insurance (COLI) raises the issue. The tax court denied a cor-
poration an interest deduction on leveraged life insurance because there was no prospect
of economic profit in Winn Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Commissioner, 113 T.C. 254 (1999). Dana
Trier plausibly objects that the law permits precisely this sort of interest-arbitrage in lever-
aged insurance within specified limitations, which the taxpayer met. See Trier, supra note
5, at 80-83.
34. The statutory rules were I.R.C. §§ 734(b) and 754, which make basis adjustments
upon partnership distributions elective. The regulatory rule was a rule in the old contin-
gent payment debt instrument regulations allowing a taxpayer to elect ratable basis recov-
ery. See Temp. Treas. Reg. § 15a.453-1(c).
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This shows that the principle at stake has to do with respect for the rule
of law rather than legislative supremacy. Isenbergh's description of the
decision in Gregory as "intuitive" and Judge McKee's description of the
decision in ACM as "visceral" not "cerebral" bring to mind a concern for
what Lon Fuller called the demands of the "inner morality of law"-
"make the law known, make it coherent and clear, see that your decisions
as an official are guided by it, etc."'35
The objection, in other words, is that these decisions are arbitrary and
non-transparent. They seem so because the outcome does not follow
from the standards. This is for the simple and often-noted reason that not
every tax motivated and insubstantial action will fail of its intended tax
purpose. 36 There is likely to be a tax motive whenever a well-advised
taxpayer makes a gift of appreciated property to a charity or buys insur-
ance with an investment component, or whenever a corporation invests in
preferred stock. Further, these actions are dubious substantively in the
sense that other actions would better serve the taxpayer's non-tax goals.
The charity would prefer to receive cash, investment via insurance tends
to have a lower pre-tax yield, and preferred stock has a lower pre-tax
yield than comparable interest-bearing securities. While these examples
might be shrugged off as academic (as I said, no tax lawyer would think
them abusive), the problem is not so easily dismissed. The standards of
tax motive and economic substance cast a pall over some day-to-day tax
planning. Consider the question whether conversion of a limited liability
company into a corporation will qualify it for a tax free merger. There is
likely to be no non-tax reason to convert the company and the action has
little substantive effect. But these are not decisive. I expect most tax
lawyers would opine that the conversion would stand up to scrutiny
though the cautious would advise that the company be run as a corpora-
tion for a decent interval before the acquisition. But no one knows for
sure whether or how much such window-dressing, is necessary. 37
But application of the standards is not arbitrary in the sense of being
random. Good tax lawyers know when they are pushing hard at the edge
of the envelope. True, in some cases, like the last example, the outcome
is up in the air. Similarly, it was not foreordained that the taxpayer in
Gregory would lose, or that the banks would win in Cottage Savings Asso-
35. LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 42 (2d ed. 1969).
36. For a particularly cogent statement, see Gunn, supra note 4, at 745-46. See also
Walter J. Blum, Knetsch v. United States: A Pronouncement on Tax Avoidance, Sup. CT.
REV. 135, 146-47, 156 (1961).
37. Rev. Rul. 70-140, 1970-1 C.B. 73, applies the step transaction doctrine to hold that
a transfer of assets to a corporation immediately prior to acquisition of that corporation by
another corporation does not qualify under section 351. Compare Weikel v. Comm'r, 51
T.C.M. (CCH) 432 (1986) (refusing to apply step transaction doctrine where several
months passed between transfer of patent to corporation and stock-for-stock exchange and
acquisition had not been finalized at time of the transfer) and West Coast Mktg. Corp. v.
Comm'r, 46 T.C. 32 (1966) (applying step transaction doctrine where taxpayer transferred
land to corporation as part of pre-arranged plan in which the corporation was acquired for
stock and immediately liquidated by the acquirer).
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ciation v. Commissioner,38 when they swapped equivalent loan portfolios
to take advantage of a tax loss. It is no coincidence that these are all
realization cases, an issue on which tax law is especially soft. But stan-
dards and fuzzy concepts generally are always unpredictable at the mar-
gin. Isenbergh recognized that tax lawyers do a pretty good job of
distinguishing the good from the bad.39 He argued this was shameful. To
the question "who ultimately benefits from this approach?," he answered
"the tax bar," observing "[t]he development of an exquisite set of intu-
itions about what kinds of transactions the courts 'like' and 'don't like'
has become a large part of what tax lawyers sell."'40 But this particular
argument misses the mark. Whatever one thinks about the merits of en-
riching tax lawyers, it is odd to blame anti-abuse law. It is the complexity
of tax law that makes its mastery valuable. Mastery of its rules would
probably be even more valuable in a world where artful plans always
succeeded. 41
We are left with the complaint that the standards are non-transparent
or opaque. When I say that the standards are opaque, I mean that they
do not explain the decisions. This quality of opaqueness is worrisome
because it can lead to bad outcomes and bad analysis. Bad outcomes can
occur when officials take the standards at their word. Commissioner v.
Court Holding Co.42 illustrates one type of bad outcome. The taxpayer, a
corporation, had already negotiated a sale of appreciated property when
its tax advisors recommended that the corporation liquidate and dis-
tribute the property to its shareholders who would go through with the
sale. At the time, a corporation did not recognize gain on a distribution
of property. The liquidation was held a sham. What is troubling about
the decision is that had the transaction always been planned as a liquida-
tion followed by a sale, there would have been no corporate level tax.43
On the same reasoning, it would be abusive for a person, who decided to
sell appreciated stock and make a gift of the proceeds to charity, to
38. 499 U.S. 554 (1991).
39. For similar testimonials, see Trier, supra note 5, at 84 (stating "[It] appears difficult
to conclude that the courts have exercised their discretion recklessly.., the taxpayers and
their counsel entering into the Merrill Lynch transactions had to know that economic sub-
stance was going to be placed in issue"); Lewis R. Steinberg, Form, Substance and Direc-
tionality in Subchapter C, 52 TAx LAW. 457 (1999) (claiming "it is averred [by others that]
practitioners possess highly-developed intuitive powers for divining the economic sub-
stance of any transaction and applying the relevant tax principles and rules in accordance
with that substance").
40. Isenbergh, supra note 1, at 883.
41. Dana Trier has suggested that the standards might be considered unfair because
similarly situated taxpayers, meaning, I gather, taxpayers who engage in similarly aggres-
sive tax planning, are treated differently. See Trier, supra note 5. This sort of inequality is
commonplace when the law is under-enforced.
42. 324 U.S. 331 (1945). This observation is inspired by Isenbergh, supra note 1, at
871-74, who offers alternative readings of the case. One reading is that the sale was com-
pleted before the dividend strategy was devised. Were this true, the case could be decided
on assignment of income grounds.
43. This was not conclusively established until a few years later in United States v.
Cumberland Public Service Co., 338 U.S. 451 (1950).
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change plans and give the stock to charity on the advice of his accountant.
A great deal that is bad and little that is good can be said about treating
actors differently depending upon when they obtain tax advice. 44 A re-
lated mistake is made by judges who submit the question of whether a
transaction is abusive to a jury on an instruction that it must be found so
if there is a tax motive and no economic substance. 45 These mistakes are
related in that both follow from the mistaken assumption that tax motive
and insubstantiality suffice to make an action abusive. Alan Gunn dis-
cusses a case involving the opposite sort of mistake in which a court ruled
for the taxpayer once it found that the transaction was not tax motivated
and had substance without considering other strong arguments against
the taxpayer's position.46 The mistake was to assume that the standards
suffice to distinguish valid tax positions from invalid ones.
The standards lead to bad analysis to the extent they deflect officials
from formulating and stating a valid reasoned explanation for a decision.
This is the heart of Alan Gunn's objection to the standard of tax motive.
His argument is that instead of relying on the standards of tax motive and
insubstantiality in cases like Gregory, Knetsch, and Goldstein, the courts
could have reached the same results by drawing on general principles of
tax law.47 Perhaps this was also Judge Learned Hand's point when he
described the rhetoric of form and substance as "anodynes for the pains
of reasoning. '48
The problems of bad outcomes and bad analysis are, to some degree,
separable. We could reduce the incidence of bad outcomes of the types in
the examples by adding the following disclaimer to the standards of tax
motive and economic substance:
A determination that an action is tax motivated or insubstantial is
neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for denying a positive
tax result to which the actor claims he is entitled under tax law.
There may be other grounds for rejecting the actor's position. These
standards do not displace other forms of reasoning. Further, some
tax motivated or insubstantial actions are respected. As for which
are respected and which are not, that is difficult to say. Do not al-
ways expect to find a rule or principle to sort them out. In a novel
case the best guide may well be professional common knowledge.
This disclaimer makes it clear that the decision about whether an action
is abusive should not, in the end, be put to the jury. While a jury might
44. See Marvin A. Chirelstein, Learned Hand's Contribution to the Law of Tax Avoid-
ance, 77 YALE L.J. 440, 456-57 (1967) (stating that "this approach led to absurdities in
practice").
45. See United States v. Wexler, 31 F.3d 117 (3d Cir. 1994). For a thoughtful discus-
sion of the instruction, see Hariton, supra note 5, at 258-60.
46. See Gunn, supra note 4, at 756-57. The case is Breech v. United States, 439 F.2d
409 (9th Cir. 1971).
47. See Gunn, supra note 4.
48. Comm'r v. Sansome, 60 F.2d 931, 933 (2d Cir. 1932). The statement is cryptic in
context because Hand makes it in extolling the statutory definition of reorganization,




make preliminary findings on the factual issues of motive and economic
effect, whether an action that is tax motivated or insubstantial is abusive
is, finally, a question requiring the expertise of a tax professional. The
disclaimer also makes clear the error in the case Gunn discusses where
the court halted analysis after finding that an action was not tax moti-
vated and had substance. And it would give the taxpayer in Court Hold-
ing a fighting chance.
While adding such a disclaimer to the standards reduces the risk of bad
decisions, there remains the objection that the standards invite unsatisfac-
tory analysis by allowing officials to rely on unstated reasons. This brings
us close to the heart of the matter. To insist that officials formulate a
reasoned, principled basis for a decision improves the quality of a deci-
sion only if we want tax law to be made principled by the officials who
administer it. I use the phrase "to be made principled" because tax law is
not naturally or intrinsically principled. If there is a deep intrinsic princi-
ple in tax law, it is the natural law of the parasite: do the least damage to
the host in extracting sustenance from it. True, some parts of tax law can
be said to be governed by fairly strong principles. Gunn observes cor-
rectly that there is a strong principle of taxing wages to the earner that is
sufficient to justify the results in the assignment of income cases. 49 But
such principles are local in operation. In much of tax law, the quest for
principle is Quixotic. There is no principled answer to the question I
posed earlier: May a limited liability company be converted into a corpo-
ration to qualify for a tax free merger with a corporation? The law of tax-
free reorganizations is not entirely unprincipled-a tax-free reorganiza-
tion requires some continuity of ownership and assets 5°-but the example
does not violate this principle. Once we get past this principle, whether a
reorganization is tax-free is a matter of form. A merger of corporations is
tax-free (if done in an approved form) 51 and so is a merger of partner-
ships, 52 but there is no provision in the law making the merger of a part-
nership and a corporation tax-free. This is true despite the fact that today
there is no relevant distinction between a partnership and a corporation.
The last example does not establish that in a case of an abusive transac-
tion no principled basis for the decision will be available. Perhaps no
principle can be identified in the example because there is no abuse. In
most cases of abuse, a principle can be identified, at least after the fact.
This is Gunn's point. Later experience supports Gunn's thesis for there is
no shortage of principled explanations for recent decisions relying on the
49. Gunn, supra note 4, at 760-65.
50. This principle is instantiated in the common law requirements of continuity of in-
terest, which traces back to Pinellas Ice & Cold Storage Co. v. Commissioner, 287 U.S. 462
(1933), and the regulatory requirement of continuity of business enterprise found in Treas.
Reg. § 1.368-1(d).
51. See I.R.C. § 368 (1989).
52. The developing body of rules on partnership mergers are mostly in the regulations




standards of tax motive and economic substance. 53 To rebut Gunn's ar-
gument that we can always formulate a principled basis for deciding that
a transaction is abusive, which can be applied without regard to tax mo-
tive or economic substance, I need to come at it from the other direction.
Only by going from principle to case can I show that sometimes principles
must be qualified by the elements of tax motive and economic substance.
I use an example from the partnership area. As a general matter, shifts
of interests in a partnership, either by transfer of an interest or by contri-
bution or distribution of assets, ought not shift or duplicate income or loss
among partners, or alter the character of a partner's income or loss. 54
One could say that this is a principle of subchapter K in the sense that this
principle best explains the rules and their evolution. Violations of the
principle have narrowed over time. But violations remain, the most
prominent resulting from the elective nature of basis adjustments on part-
nership distributions. 55 The transaction in the ACM case exploited pre-
cisely this "loophole" in tax law along with an elective rule in the old
installment sale regulations that artificially accelerated income. If I had
to state a principled basis for the decision in ACM, it would be the princi-
ple against shifting or duplicating losses. But the taxpayer could respond
that they were within an established exception to the principle. The part-
nership anti-abuse regulations solve this conundrum by taking the posi-
tion that partners can choose not to make a section 754 election, though
they know this will duplicate losses, so long as they reached the position
where this choice was presented in the ordinary course of business.56
What is abusive is to do what was done in ACM-to enter a partnership
that has little or no economic substance with the goal from the start of
creating an artificial loss. 57 The message is that you can pick up tax gold
if you find it in the street while going about your business, but you cannot
go hunting for it.
The anti-stripping ruling and regulations 58 lead to a similar problem
that can be resolved in the same way. The ruling and regulations target
"obligation-shifting transactions" in which one person assumes an obliga-
tion to provide property or services in the future for which another per-
son has already been paid (and taxed on the payment). The ultimate
principle violated is the same principle against shifting or duplicating
losses, now operating outside of subchapter K. Richard Lipton has ar-
53. I trace the history of recent anti-abuse decisions in subchapter K and explain how
Treasury gradually developed middle range principles to justify the rulings in Mark P.
Gergen, Subchapter K and Passive Financial Intermediation, 51 SMU L. REV. 37, 68-73
(1997). For alternative principled accounts of Saba and ACM, which involved the same
shelter, and Compaq, see Trier, supra note 5, at 72-80.
54. For statements of this principle, see William D. Andrews, Inside Basis Adjustments
and Hot Asset Exchanges in Partnership Distributions, 47 TAX L. REV. 3 (1991); Karen C.
Burke, Partnership Distributions: Options for Reform, 3 FLA. TAX REV. 677, 704 (1998).
55. I.R.C. §§ 734(b), 754 (2000).
56. Treas. Reg. § 1.701-2(d) (ex. 9).
57. Treas. Reg. § 1.701-2(d) (ex. 8).
58. See Treas. Reg. § 1.7701(l)-2; I.R.S. Notice 95-53, 1995-2 C.B. 334.
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gued that the principle stated in the regulations is overbroad because it
might apply to "[any sale of property that occurs after rent prepay-
ments." 59 We can answer that the principle does not apply if the rent
prepayments and sale were not part of a plan to create an artificial loss to
benefit the buyer of the property. This would be found tax gold, not
made tax gold.
These examples show that sometimes principles must be qualified by
the elements of tax motive and economic substance because the princi-
ples are not absolute, which brings us to the nub of the matter. One con-
sequence of pursuing the course advocated by Gunn-which is to eschew
the standards of tax motive and economic substance to decide abuse cases
entirely on grounds of principle-is to give the judicial and executive
branches greater power to eliminate deviations from principle in tax law
on a case-by-case basis. The standards of tax motive and economic sub-
stance implicitly limit this power to cases where the taxpayer is con-
sciously trying to exploit a flaw in tax law through actions that have no
substance. To make this abstract point more concrete, consider the con-
sequences of untethering the principle against allowing shifts in partner-
ship interest to yield artificial losses from the standards of tax motive and
economic substance. This would change the result in example 9 of the
section 701 regulations, which states that partners may elect not to make
basis adjustments upon a distribution even though they know at the time
of distribution that this will create an artificial loss by duplicating a loss. 60
The standards of tax motive and economic substance are a product of our
commitment to rules in the sense that they follow from a judgment that
principle should not always trump over rule.
This only addresses Gunn's argument that the elements of tax motive
and economic substance should play no role in the law. There remains a
great deal of force in his arguments even after this hard edge is taken off.
It should be a truism that the more guidance or authority an official can
take from tax law (however broadly defined), the less weight she need
place on the elements of tax motive or economic substance. For example,
if an official concludes that a rule-maker would not have intended for a
rule to apply in a situation, though the rule's text is to the contrary, then
she could decide on interpretive grounds without concerning herself with
tax motive or economic substance. 61 And I expect that no one would
59. Richard M. Lipton, 'Obligation-Shifting' Prop. Regs.-Is Deemed Loan Treatment
the Right Approach?, 86 J. TAX'N 209, 211 (1997).
60. See Treas. Reg. § 1.701-2(d) (ex. 9).
61. The FASIT rules offer an arcane example. It is essential that a residual interest in
a FASIT be held by a tax-paying entity so the statute prohibits most tax-indifferent entities
from owning a residual interest, but omits Indian tribes. The industry took advantage of
this omission by placing residual interests with Indian tribes. One need not decry the tax
motive behind this act to hold that Indian tribes are not qualified to be owners of residual
interests. It is plain that Indian tribes would have been included in the statutory prohibi-
tion had the possibility crossed anyone's mind. For more on this tawdry story, see Calvin




take issue with the proposition that reasoned decisions are better than
unreasoned decisions. My point is a fairly modest one. Logic will take us
only so far. Some decisions are not reducible to principles that can be
stated authoritatively or that can be applied axiomatically. Anti-abuse
law in this respect is like the common law: "it lacks an authoritative au-
thentic text; ... it '. . . professes... to develop and apply principles that
have never been committed to any authentic form of words.'"62
This explanation of the function played by the standards of tax motive
and economic substance is conducive to David Weisbach's economic ar-
gument for anti-abuse standards. 63 Weisbach argues that the combination
of simple rules and anti-abuse standards may best balance the interests in
accurately measuring income, minimizing compliance and administrative
costs, and minimizing distortionary effects of tax on behavior. 64 The rules
governing basis adjustments upon shifts in partnership interests provide a
concrete illustration. Adjustments are made elective for administrative
reasons. Adjustments require valuation of partnership assets, which can
be costly, and accounting for adjustments can be quite cumbersome. In
making adjustments elective, the interest in accurately measuring income
gives way to the interest in minimizing compliance and administrative
costs. 65 This may be well and good as long as the resulting errors in the
measurement of income are inadvertent. But the temptation is created
for actors to alter their conduct, sometimes incurring real non-tax costs,
to reap a tax benefit by exploiting the rule not requiring adjustments.
Such behavior exacerbates the mismeasurement of income and to the ex-
tent transaction or other costs are incurred in the effort, the behavior also
compromises the rule's administrative benefits. Two possible responses
are to change the general rule to require basis adjustments upon all shifts
in interests, or to add a rule to require adjustments in a defined subset of
cases where measurement errors are likely to be most favorable to tax-
62. A.W.B. SIMPSON, The Common Law and Legal Theory, in LEGAL THEORY AND
LEGAL HISTORY 359, 370 (1987) (quoting F. POLLOCK, A FIRST BOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE
249 (3d ed. 1911)).
63. Weisbach, supra note 10.
64. David Weisbach and Daniel Shaviro show that a more complete economic analysis
is quite complex. One complicating factor is that an anti-abuse standard or rule may
worsen the distortionary effect of the rule mismeasuring income by inducing actors to alter
their behavior in costly ways to cloak their actions with substance. Further, a rule may
distort behavior in ways that offset other tax distortions of behavior and so the net effect is
to enhance welfare. For an integrated analysis taking account of both phenomena, see
Shaviro, supra note 10, at 237-38. I discuss the latter phenomenon in exploring the ques-
tion of whether the creation of equity-hybrids that provide the issuer an interest deduction
on equity-like instruments might reduce the harmful distortionary effects of the corporate
income tax in Mark P. Gergen & Paula Schmitz, The Influence of Tax Law on Securities
Innovation in the United States: 1981-1997, 52 TAX L. REV. 119, 184-92 (1997). We con-
clude that on balance the effect of hybrids probably is harmful but note that it is an empiri-
cal question upon which there is insufficient data.
65. For an argument that these tradeoffs are susceptible to utilitarian calculus by ex-
amining the social welfare functions of individuals who benefit by the mismeasurement of
income and those who are hurt by it (primarily those who bear the additional tax burden),
see Louis Kaplow, How Tax Complexity and Enforcement Affect the Equity and Efficiency
of the Income Tax, 49 NAT'L TAX J. 135 (1996).
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payers. But these responses increase compliance costs, in the first in-
stance, across the board and in the second, in all transactions within the
penumbra of the exception to the general rule. Conditioning application
of the general rule on the absence of tax motive and the presence of eco-
nomic substance may restore something approximating the original bal-
ance by suppressing efforts to exploit the general rule. A virtue of the
standards of tax motive and economic substance is that they ought to
impinge little on non-tax driven business decisions. Of course, there is a
corresponding vice-the standards poorly suppress the behavior they aim
at because of their generosity and because they are not self-executing.
But it is at least conceivable that the simple rule and anti-abuse standards
strike the best balance. This is a rough sketch of Weisbach's argument.
One point Weisbach might take from Gunn is that the debate regarding
anti-abuse law raises an important question that goes beyond the "rules/
standards problem" and economic analysis. 66 The key difference be-
tween rules and standards is when the law's command is given content.
Under a rule it is done ex ante. Under a standard it is done ex post or
retroactively. Gunn endorses retroactive law making in response to tax
abuse but rejects the standards of tax motive and economic substance. 67
There is no contradiction here. The common law methods of reasoning
by analogy and reasoning from principle can be "flexible [and] context-
sensitive" and not "formal and mechanical," much like standards. 68 The
method of reasoning from statutory purpose can have the same qualities.
Ideally, a standard states the normative criteria that officials will apply
case-by-case to determine the law's command. The risk-utility standard
for design defects in the law of products liability is a good example. 69 The
stated elements of the standards of tax motive and economic substance
are purely factual. The normative element is implicit. One way to ex-
press Gunn's challenge to the standards is he thinks that the normative
element of the analysis ought to be made explicit; that reasoning from
analogy, from principle, or from purpose are the proper techniques, and
that skillful employment of these techniques can obviate the need to ad-
vert to tax motive or economic substance. This challenge can be an-
swered only from an internal-to-law perspective. My answer is that these
methods run afoul of our commitment to rules.
Putting Weisbach's work along side the work of an earlier time shows
the sea change that has occurred in tax scholarship. Gunn and Isen-
bergh's arguments are first and foremost arguments of tax law, and their
normative criteria-the criteria of coherency, consistency, and clarity-
66. Weisbach, supra note 10, at 864.
67. See Gunn, supra note 4, at 767.
68. Standards usually are defined in contraposition to rules in the following way:
"Rules are legal norms that are formal and mechanical. They are triggered by a few easily
identified factual matters and are opaque in application to the values that they are de-
signed to serve. Standards, on the other hand, are flexible, context-sensitive legal norms
that require evaluative judgments in their application." Larry Alexander & Ken Kress,
Against Legal Principles, 82 IoWA L. REV. 739, 740 (1997).
69. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRoDuCrs LIABILrrY § 2(b) (1997).
20011
SMU LAW REVIEW
are, in a sense, intrinsic to the law. Weisbach's argument is about tax
law-it is about what form of tax law is most efficient-it is not an argu-
ment of tax law. In Weisbach's analysis, the value of coherency, consis-
tency, and clarity is entirely instrumental.
A strength of the economic perspective is that by taking us outside the
law it helps untangle some knotty doctrinal problems. It puts in perspec-
tive the elusive concepts of form and substance. Joseph Isenbergh has
said: "When we are dealing with statutory terms of art, the form-sub-
stance dichotomy is a false one. 'Substance' can only be derived from
forms created by the statute itself. Here substance is form and little else;
there is no natural law of reverse triangular mergers. '70 The implication
is that some things do exist outside the law and that for these "real"
things the form-substance dichotomy is meaningful. But tax law is artifi-
cial through and through. Tax law rules largely refer to phenomena-
corporation, debt, equity, ownership, sale-that, while they may exist
outside tax law, still are matters of human artifice. Further, these phe-
nomena poorly correspond with what we are trying to measure with the
rules of tax law (typically income) or what we are trying to do with the
law (ultimately raise revenue at the least cost). The artificiality of tax law
is especially apparent in the area of corporate finance today because tax
law employs business and accounting concepts that modern finance has
deconstructed. 71 The problem is not unique to the financial arena. Sham
divorces are possible only in a world where the acts of marriage and di-
vorce can be understood as devoid of real significance or meaning.
Artificial concepts are a poor tool for regulating opportunistic tax plan-
ning. Dana Trier has argued that Esmark, Inc. v. Commissioner72 was an
easy case because it "came down to whether Mobil was ever the owner of
stock for tax purposes ... [and] there was no other better candidate for
ownership of the stock [in question] than Mobil."'73 This argument is dif-
ficult to accept on its face. Trier concedes the plasticity of the concept of
ownership-property is, tritely, a bundle of sticks-while insisting on a
highly formal definition-in Trier's view, there is always an owner, and it
is whoever has the most sticks in the bundle no matter how small his
handful.
Two general propositions tend to press on the minds of people who try
to solve the puzzle of anti-abuse law. One is that "a more complex, tax
advantaged way of executing a transaction should not lack economic sub-
stance if the transaction itself has economic substance." 74 The other pro-
position is that anti-abuse law is peculiarly concerned with transactions
70. Isenbergh, supra note 1, at 879.
71. See Jeff Strnad, Taxing New Financial Products: A Conceptual Framework, 46
STAN. L. REV. 569 (1994).
72. 90 T.C. 171 (1988), affd, 886 F.2d 1318 (7th Cir. 1989).
73. Trier, supra note 5, at 69-70. Mobil acquired the Esmark stock for cash in a pre-
arranged deal designed to acquire an Esmark subsidiary without Esmark recognizing gain
on the sale of the subsidiary.
74. Hariton, supra note 5, at 236.
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designed to create artificial losses, what Trier calls "loss generators. '75
Both propositions echo in Judge Cohen's distinction of Compaq and Es-
mark. There is a difference, he said, "between (1) closing out a real
economic loss in order to minimize taxes or arranging a contemplated...
transaction in a tax-advantaged manner and (2) entering into a prear-
ranged loss transaction designed solely for the reduction of taxes on unre-
lated income."'76 In other words, while actors may be free to time the
realization of gains and losses to their advantage, they are not free to
enter into transactions solely to create artificial losses to shelter income.
As a descriptive matter, these observations are accurate only as expres-
sion of tendencies in the law; they do not pass as categorical rules or
principles. There was a real transaction at the heart of the transaction in
the ACM case, a debt repurchase by Colgate. 77 And many anti-abuse
cases involve issues of timing. Still these propositions press on the mind
because they are consistent with the day-to-day experience of tax lawyers.
Often transactions may be structured in multiple ways with different tax
consequences. There is a great deal of control over the timing of gain and
loss. And it is very difficult to shelter income.
An advocate for weaving these or other precepts into anti-abuse law
might concede their descriptive weakness but argue that there is no better
alternative. As we have seen, the standards of tax motive and economic
substance are overbroad. The substantive principles we can discern in tax
law are not absolute. The phenomena referred to in tax law are artificial.
An economic perspective may help us understand the value of the stan-
dards of tax motive and economic substance, but for many reasons, we do
not want officials to pass on the merits of specific transactions by asking
what rule is efficient for that transaction.
But economic analysis points to another possible solving criteria to
supplement the standards of tax motive and economic substance. It is the
same criteria to which legal analysis points. From an allocative perspec-
tive, the evil in exploitative tax planning lies more in the effort spent in
playing the game than in the outcome. The outcome is mostly of distribu-
tive significance.78 Logically, the game is most costly to play when it is
75. Trier, supra note 5, at 66.
76. Compaq Computer Corp. v. Comm'r, 113 T.C. 214, 220 (1999).
77. Hariton tries to explain this away. "If one eliminated the CINS transaction, how-
ever, the subsequent repurchase of Colgate debt would not have been affected .... More-
over, the relevant tax benefit (a large capital loss) bore no relation to the repurchase of
outstanding debt." Hariton, supra note 5, at 236. This leaves little substance to the initial
proposition. With this modification, "a more complex, tax-advantaged way of executing a
transaction" of substance will lack economic substance if the tax-advantaged feature or
step was not essential to completion of the transaction or if the tax benefit did not bear the
proper relationship to the transaction. Id.
78. I expect that individual tax avoidance redounds largely to the benefit of the well-
to-do. If we assume that the burden of the revenue loss is borne generally, then there will
be some welfare loss in the distributive effects. To determine the welfare effects of the
distributive consequences of corporate tax avoidance, we would need to know who bears
the burden of the corporate income tax. A complication is that it is not necessarily the case
that there is no social value in resources spent playing the tax game. Contracts or arrange-
ments that are devised for their tax benefits may have social value. The concept of the
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played in novel ways, and the incentive to play in novel ways is greatest
when novel ends are sought. Novelty, then, is the solving criteria. The
standards of tax motive and economic substance ought to target novel
plans to achieve novel tax ends. What is novel depends on what tax law-
yers commonly do and have done, as well as visible positive tax law and
the principles that might be said to be immanent in the law.
No doubt lawyers and law-minded scholars will continue to try to ra-
tionalize anti-abuse law around a verbal formula that does not leave the
issue so up in the air. Learned Hand's career-long struggle with the issue
of form and substance in tax law is a cautionary tale for those who pursue
this grail.79 Hand saw that a policy of literalism sometimes was untenable
in tax law, 80 that an inquiry into legislative purpose often was an unsatis-
factory alternative, 81 and that solving concepts could not always be found
outside tax law.82 But neither would he condemn tax saving actions tout
court.83 Given his "penchant for logical statement," 84 nor could Hand
could be satisfied with leaving the distinction between abusive and non-
abusive tax planning a matter of common understanding or intuition. In
his "last major encounter with the subject of tax avoidance," 85 Hand tried
to define abuse in terms of economic substance. The form of an act
would be respected for tax purposes, Hand wrote, only if the actors did
"suppose that the difference[s] would appreciably affect their beneficial
interests.., other than taxwise. ''86 Marvin Chirelstein has translated this
as a rule that "ambiguous transactions were to be characterized in the
Commissioner's favor, unless the taxpayer could dispel the ambiguity by
showing that the form which he had chosen carried with it, or was ex-
pected to carry with it, some appreciable economic effect beyond tax sav-
ings."87 Neither will do. This "rule" is terribly overbroad. It becomes
trust originates in tax avoidance. Some valuable financial innovations in recent years may
have been partly stimulated by tax benefits. See Gergen & Schmitz, supra note 64, at 150,
170-74 (giving as examples zero coupon bonds, the Eurobond market, and LYONS).
79. This history is engagingly told in Chirelstein, supra note 44.
80. The classic statement of this is set forth in Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809, 810-
11 (2d Cir. 1934).
81. See Chirelstein, supra note 44, at 473.
82. As Chirelstein tells the story, Hand was not entirely consistent on this. He initially
took the position "that the separate status of corporation and shareholder could not thus
be disregarded," which case was subsequently reversed by the Supreme Court in Higgins v.
Smith, 308 U.S. 473 (1940). Chirelstein, supra note 44, at 448. Hand solved this particular
puzzle by reasoning that the separate status of corporation and shareholder could not be
disregarded if the corporation "does some 'business' in the ordinary meaning." Id. at 450-
51 (quoting Nat'l Investors Corp. v. Hoey, 144 F.2d 446, 468 (2d Cir. 1944)). In Gilbert v.
Commissioner, 248 F.2d 399, 412 (2d Cir. 1957), Hand rejected the position that whether a
shareholder could take a bad debt deduction on money advanced to the corporation could
be resolved by asking whether the advance would be treated as a debt for non tax
purposes.
83. For a famous statement of this position, see Commissioner v. Newman, 159 F.2d
848, 850-51 (2d Cir. 1947) (Hand, J., dissenting).
84. Chirelstein, supra note 44, at 473 (quoting Maurice Finkelstein, The Corporate En-
tity and the Income Tax, 44 YALE L.J. 436, 449 (1935)).
85. Id. at 459. Hand was writing in dissent in Gilbert.
86. Gilbert, 248 F.2d at 412.
87. Chirelstein, supra note 44, at 464.
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terribly underbroad if one adds to the rule, as Chirelstein suggests, that
Hand may have implied, a limitation of the rule to transactions not be-
tween unrelated parties. 88 If Learned Hand could not rationalize anti-
abuse law, we are unlikely to do better. Still those who pursue the grail
should be applauded for their pursuit bespeaks a belief in the integrity of
tax law. The health of tax law depends upon practitioners believing that
it is principled.
88. See id. at 469-70.
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